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Anna M. Cienciala. Prefatory Note to:  
“Poland in British and French Policy in 1939: Determination to Fight or Avoid 
War?” (The Polish Review, v. XXXIV, 1989, no. 3).  
[In the reprint of this article in: Patrick Finney, ed., The Origins of the Second 
World War (London, New York, Sydney, Auckland, 1997), pp. 413‐433, the editor 
omitted some material in the notes and renumbered them.]  
  Since this article appeared in late 1989 and was reprinted in 1997, most of 
the archival Polish documents cited in it have been published in Polish and 
English. The Polish‐language documents appeared in three volumes: (1) Polskie 
Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1938, edited by Marek Kornat (Warsaw, 2007), covers 
the calendar year; (2) Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1939, edited by 
Stanisław Żerko (Warsaw, 2005), covers the period January‐end August; (3) 
Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1939 (Warsaw, 2007), edited by Wojciech 
Rojek, covers the period September 1 – December 31,  1939. The English‐
language volume, Polish Documents on Foreign Policy, 24 October 1938 ‐ 30 
September 1939, edited by Włodzimierz Borodziej and Sławomir Dębski (Warsaw 
2009), contains translations of key documents for this period. (See Cienciala 
review, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 22, March 2011, No. 1, pp. 172‐174. 
Corrections: on p. 172, par. 2, lines 3‐4 should read: …had for years seen them as 
reasonable…p. 174, line 2, should read: …they had no plans...) 
  The names of two key archival depositories cited in the article have 
changed: The Sikorski Institute is now called: The Polish Institute and Polish 
Museum (PISM); the Public Record Office (PRO) is now: The National Archives 
(TNA). 
Corrections. 
p. 201, par. 1, line 7: eliminate the word: two 
“     “     “      2,   bottom line, add after: will.  
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Furthermore, despite his declaration at the Munich Conference at the end of 
September 1938, that he wanted no more territory; in mid‐March 1939, Hitler 
annexed the remaining Czech lands and created the Slovak Republic, while a few 
days later, he annexed the Lithuanian port and region of Klaipeda (G. Memel). 
Thus, it was clear that his word could not be trusted. 
p. 203, par. 1, line 3, should read: …Danzig and at least part of the Polish 
Corridor… 
p. 203, n. 14, add: see note 8 above. 
p. 204, par. 1, line 4 from bottom, omit word: Next 
      “        “    2, line 6 from bottom should read: …recall that Soviet… 
       “           n. 21, line 1, should read: …Beck’s instructions to Łukasiewicz... 
p. 205, end of line 5 should read: a guarantee of Poland’s independence. 
p. 209, par. 1, line 1, 2nd sentence should read: As noted earlier…. 
p.    “      “     “    “    7, exaggerated – replace with: demonstrative 
p. 210, par. 1, line 11 should read: …and it was understood that this included 
Danzig. 
p. 210, n. 40, date should read: 20 May 1939 
p. 211, n. 48, line 3 should read: Dr. Carl J. Burckhardt 
p.213, after end of note 54, add: For a more recent study, see Anna M. Cienciala, 
“The Nazi‐Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939: When Did Stalin Decide to Align with 
Hitler, and Was Poland the Culprit,” in: M.B.B. Biskupski, ed., Ideology, Politics and 
Diplomacy in East Central Europe (Rochester, NY, 2003), pp. 147‐226. The volume 
was published in honor of Prof. Piotr S. Wandycz, and contains a bibliography of 
his works up to 2002. 
p. 214, par 1, last line: beleived should read: believed 
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p. 216, par 1, last line should read: … Berlin, where he agreed to the German 
occupation of his country rather than face bloodshed and destruction. 
p. 217, par. 2, end of line 5: ambassador should be: Ambassador 
p. 219, par. 2, line 8, should read: ...to the British note… 
p. 222, n. 93 should read: … see Stachiewicz, ibid., … 
p. 224, par.1, lines 1‐2 should read:  
The British goal of giving a guarantee of her independence to Poland on March 
31, 1939, concluding the provisional Anglo‐Polish Agreement on Mutual 
Assistance of April 6, … 
p. 224,  par. 2 of (2), the  last two lines should read:  
that they had abandoned their commitment to bomb military objectives in 
western Germany if the Germans bombed the same in Poland.  
p. 225, par 2, last sentence should read: After the Nazi‐Soviet Pact… 
p. 226, after end of par., add: 
For the reader’s information, Russian‐language diplomatic documents for 1939, 
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, then the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 1990‐92, do not contain information 
on why and when Stalin decided to align with Hitler. They are cited and the issue 
is discussed in the Cienciala study added to p. 213, note 54.   
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ANNA M. CIENCIALA 
POLAND IN BRITISH AND FRENCH POLICY IN 1939: 
DETERMINATION TO FIGHT—OR AVOID WAR?* 
Historians still differ on the meaning of the British guarantee to Poland of 
March 31 , 1939, and on the policy that flowed from it. Basically, opinion 
differs on whether the guarantee marked the end of appeasement—as symbol-
ized by the Munich agreement of September 29, 1938—or whether it was a 
continuation of this policy. 
In the period 1945-61, Western historians condemned Munich and saw the 
British guarantee as the beginning of a new policy of standing up to Hitler. 
However, A. J.P. Taylor challenged this view in 1961, claiming that the guar-
antee was, in fact, a continuation of appeasement since it envisaged further 
territorial revision in Eastern Europe. He believed this policy was justified by 
the goal of saving peace. 1 In 1969-70, the opening of British archives for 
the years 1938-39 (under the new 30-year rule), led Western historians to 
sympathize with British policy-makers, who had to work under specific eco-
nomic, domestic, and strategic constraints. Therefore, since 1970, Western 
publications have generally agreed that until March 1939, Britain had no alter-
native to appeasement. 2 Moreover, some historians wjio interpreted appease-
ment in the classical sense of settling disputes by negotiation, discovered it to 
be a traditional British policy pursued since the mid-nineteenth century and 
dictated by such factors as: Britain's global commitments, i.e., her Empire, 
by the need for peace to carry on trade, by domestic economic pressures, and 
finally by a public opinion opposed to war. In this framework, Munich is seen 
as the last manifestation of a traditional policy, which then broke down. An-
other variation on the theme is to see British policy in 1939 as aiming to secure 
* A n earlier version o f this paper was del ivered at the International Conference on Interwar 
Poland, Indiana Univers i ty , B l o o m i n g t o n , Ind. , Feb . 1985; the conference papers are to appear 
in 1989 . A Polish vers ion w a s published in Zeszyty Historyczne, no . 7 5 , Paris, 1986 , pp. 1 5 2 — 
183 . 
1 A . J . P . Taylor , The Origins of the Second World War, London , 1 9 6 1 , pp. 189 ff. 
2 For a useful survey of interpretations o f appeasement up to 1975 , see: Donald C. Watt, "The 
Historiography o f A p p e a s e m e n t , " in: Crisis and Controversy. Essays in Honour of A.J.P. Taylor, 
edited by Alan Sked and Christopher C o o k , L o n d o n , 1976 , ch . 6 . For up-to-date d iscuss ions o f 
Taylor ' s v i e w s , see: The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered. The A.J.P. Taylor 
Debate After Twenty-five Years, edited by Gordon Martel , B o s t o n , London , Sydney , 1986 . A 
useful co l lec t ion of papers, including s o m e by German historians is to be found in: The Fascist 
Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, edited by Wol fgang J. M o m m s e n and Lothar Ketten-
acker, L o n d o n , Bos ton , S y d n e y , 1982 . 
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peace by means of another Four Power Pact, i.e., excluding the Soviet Union. 3 
While there is a general consensus that March 1939 marked the beginning 
of a new trend in British policy, there are contradictory views on what it was 
expected to achieve. On the one hand, Sidney Aster claims the aim was to 
strengthen Poland's bargaining position so that she could negotiate with Ger­
many "on an equal footing and free from the fear of force;" thus, he concludes 
that it was not appeasement. 4 As we shall see later, this was, in fact, the view 
held by Foreign Secretary Lord Edward Halifax, by Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain, and by most officials of the Foreign Office. On the other hand, 
Simon Newman sees the guarantee as a continuation of Britain's traditional 
balance of power policy which, he claims, included the maintenance of the 
status quo in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, he claims the guarantee was delib­
erately intended to prevent a peaceful German­Polish settlement, and so pro­
voke a war in which Poland would have to fight on Britain's side. Thus, 
Newman concludes that Britain bears part of the blame for the outbreak of the 
war. 5 As we shall see, this interpretation is at variance with British documents, 
including those cited by the author. 
To conclude this historiographical survey, we should note that German his­
torians have published many valuable studies on appeasement in British pol­
icy. 6 Furthermore, there is one Polish­language study of the British guarantee 
to Poland, based on Polish archival documents and published sources, also a 
Polish article and an English­language study of British policy toward Poland 
in 1939, based mainly on archival British documents. 7 In this article, I will 
present conclusions based on my own research, as presented in papers and 
3 S e e espec ia l ly : Paul K e n n e d y , Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1983, L o n d o n , 1 9 8 3 , pp. 1 3 -
3 9 . His paper w a s first published in 1 9 7 6 , as w a s Paul Schroeder's article with the same thesis: 
"Munich and the British Tradit ion," The Historical Journal, v. 19, no . 1, 1 9 7 6 , pp. 2 2 3 ^ 3 . 
Gottfried Niedhart argues that British pol icy aimed at another Four P o w e r Pact exc lud ing the 
Sov ie t U n i o n , see his article: "Appeasement: die britische Antwort auf die Krise des Weltre ichs 
und des internationalen S y s t e m s vor d e m zwe i ten Weltkr ieg ," Historische Zeitschrift, v . 2 2 5 , n o . 
1, 1 9 7 8 , pp. 6 7 - 8 8 . This is a deve lopment o f the argument he presented in his: "Die britisch-
französ iche Garantieerklärung für Polen v o m 31 Marz 1939: Aussenpol i t i scher Kurswechse l der 
W e s t m ä c h t e ? " in: Francia: Forschungen zur Westeuropäischer Geschichte, n o . 2 , 1 9 7 4 , pp . 
5 9 7 - 6 1 8 . 
4 S i d n e y Aster , 1939. The Making of the Second World War, N e w York, 1 9 7 2 , pp. 1 4 - 1 6 , 
3 5 9 - 6 0 . 
5 S i m o n N e w m a n , March 1939. The British Guarantee to Poland. Oxford , 1 9 7 6 , pp. 136 , 
1 9 5 - 9 6 , 2 2 0 - 2 3 . 
6 S e e : M o m m s e n and Kettenacker, note 2 above; also Paul K e n n e d y ' s rev iew article: "The 
L o g i c of A p p e a s e m e n t , " The Times Literary Supplement, L o n d o n , 2 8 M a y 1 9 8 2 , pp. 5 8 5 - 6 1 8 . 
7 Henryk Jack iewicz , Brytyjskie gwarancje dla Polski w 1939 roku, Olsz tyn , 1980; Anita Praz-
m o w s k a , Britain, Poland, and the Eastern Front, 1939, Cambridge , E n g . , L o n d o n , N e w York, 
e t c . , 1987; cf. A n n a Garlicka, "Wysi lki W . Brytanii w ce lu stworzenia w Europie Srodkowej i 
P o l u d n i o w o - W s c h o d n i e j frontu antyn iemieck iego ," Studia z Dziejöw ZSRR i Eur ору Srodkowej, 
v. X X I I , W a r s a w , 1986 , pp. 1 3 5 - 5 0 . 
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publications which may not be easily accessible to readers of The Polish 
Review.8 
We should note that in most of the studies cited above, scant attention was 
paid to French policy in 1938-39. This was due to the assumption that France 
merely followed the British lead, an assumption reinforced by the fact that, 
with some personal exceptions, the archives of the French Foreign Ministry 
for the period 1930-39 were closed to scholars until the early 1970's. Since 
that time, however, many volumes of French documents have appeared, as 
well as two major studies by the English historian, Anthony Adamthwaite, 9 
and the French historian, J. B. Duroselle. 1 0 They show that while French 
statesmen believed they could not act without British support, most were, in 
fact, just as anxious to reach a settlement with Hitler as were the British. There 
is also a useful collection of papers presented in a 1975 colloquium on Franco-
British relations, which includes a brief study on France, Britain, and Poland 
in 1939. 1 1 
* * * 
Let us now take a look at the issue that allegedly led to the outbreak of the 
Second World War, i.e., the Free City of Gdansk (Danzig), and the so-called 
Polish Corridor, i.e., Polish Pomerania (Pomorze).* Some Western historians 
fail to see why the Poles refused Hitler's demands for the return of the city to 
Germany and for an extraterritorial German highway and railway through the 
Corridor. They argue that even if most of Polish trade went by sea in 1937, it 
was, after all, possible for Poland to agree to the return of Danzig to Germany 
with guarantees for Polish rights there, and a guaranteed access to Gdynia 
through a belt of territory in the Polish Corridor containing an extraterritorial 
German highway and railway. These historians do not seem to realize that 
Poland's acceptance of these terms would have meant not only putting some 
Polish-speaking territory in the Corridor under German administration, but 
would also have made Polish access to the two ports of Gdynia and Danzig, 
and therefore the whole Polish economy, entirely dependent on German good 
will. In view of the above, the Poles rightly saw Hitler's demands as aiming 
8 S e e : A n n a M . Ciencia la , Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939. A Study in the Interde-
pendence of Eastern and Western Europe, L o n d o n , Toronto , 1968; s a m e , paper on the British 
Guarantee to Poland o f 31 March 1 9 3 9 , read at the Amer ican Historical Assoc iat ion C o n v e n t i o n , 
N e w York, D e c . 1979; s a m e , "Polska w pol i tyce brytyjskiej i francuskiej w 1939 roku: w o l a 
walki c z y pröba unikniçcia wojny?" Zeszyty Historyczne, no . 7 5 , Paris, 1986 , pp. 1 5 2 - 8 3 . 
9 Anthony Adamthwai te , France and the Coming of the Second World War, 1936-1939, Lon-
d o n , 1977 . 
1 0 J . B . Durose l l e , La Décadence, 1932-1939, Paris, 1979. 
1 1 Henri Miche l , "France, Grande-Bretagne et Po logne (Mars-Août 1939) ," in Les Relations 
Franco-britanniques de 1935 à 1939, Paris ( C N R S ) , 1 9 7 5 , pp. 3 8 3 - 4 0 1 . 
*In this article, I wi l l use the terms D a n z i g , and the Pol ish Corridor, instead o f Gdansk and 
Pol i sh Pomerania , because they are more familiar to Western historians o f the interwar period. 
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at the total subordination of their country to Germany. A few spirited members 
of the British Foreign Office and the Ambassador to Poland shared the Polish 
point of view, but they were in the minority. 1 2 
Here we should also mention that Poland's policy of good relations with 
Germany, initiated by the Polish-German Declaration of Nonaggression of 
January 26, 1934, was seen then, and is sometimes seen today, as pro-German. 
In fact, the aim of Polish foreign policy was to have good relations with both 
great neighbors, while not being dependent on either, since this was seen as 
the end of Polish independence. Thus, the Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact 
of July 1932, was balanced by the agreement with Germany in 1934, while 
the latter was balanced by extending the pact with the USSR for ten years. At 
the same time, the Franco-Polish alliance and military convention of February 
1921 remained the sheet anchor of Polish policy, though Poland did not follow 
France when this was seen as contrary to vital Polish interests. Furthermore, 
the policy of good relations with Germany, which is attributed to Foreign 
Minister Jozef Beck, was, in fact, initiated by Marshal Jozef Pilsudski in re-
sponse to the conciliatory policy followed by London and Paris toward Berlin, 
beginning with the Locarno Treaties of October 16, 1925. 1 3 
Finally, we should recall that German demands for the return of Danzig to 
Germany and for German extraterritorial communications through the Polish 
Corridor to Danzig and East Prussia—demands put forward in October 1938, 
repeated in January 1939, and again in March 1939—were rejected by Poland. 
In January 1939, the Polish Cabinet decided not to negotiate on the basis of 
Hitler's demands since, if granted, more would follow and lead ultimately to 
the loss of Polish independence. Therefore, Polish counter-proposals envis-
aged a joint Polish-German guarantee of the Free City and more facilities 
for German traffic through the Corridor, but without extraterritorial rights. 
Although these Polish-German talks were secret—for each side hoped to reach 
its respective goals with time—it should be noted that the Polish decision to 
1 2 For the v i e w that the maintenance of the Free City o f D a n z i g w a s not a vital Pol ish interest 
in 1 9 3 9 , see: D e s m o n d W i l l i a m s , "Negot iat ions Leading to the Ang lo -Po l i sh Agreement o f 31 
March 1939,"part II, Irish Historical Studies, v. X , no . 3 8 , Dubl in , September 1956 , p. 187. 
For Pol i sh v i e w s as reported from Warsaw by French ambassador Leon N o ë l , see: D . 2 8 9 of 17 
M a y 1 9 3 9 , Documents Diplomatiques Français, (henceforth D D F ) 2nd ser. v. X V I , p. 196. For 
a spirited agreement with the Polish point o f v i e w by a f e w members of the Foreign Off ice , see 
F . O . memorandum on D a n z i g , 5 May 1939 , Documents on British Foreign Policy, (henceforth 
D B F P ) , 3rd. ser. v. VI , appendix II. 
n S e e A . M . Ciencia la , Poland and the Western Powers, pp. 1 - 1 9 , and same: "Polish Foreign 
Po l i cy 1 9 3 6 - 1 9 3 9 : 'Equi l ibrium,' Stereotype and Real i ty ," The Polish Review, v . X X , no . 1, 
N e w York , 1 9 7 5 , pp . 4 2 - 5 8 ; for an exce l lent detai led study see: Michal J. Zacharias , Polska 
wobec zmian w ukladzie s'ilpolitycznych w Europie w latach 1932-1936, Wroc law, 1981 ; see a lso 
Piotr S . W a n d y c z ' s definitive study: The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926-1936, 
French-@?e~choslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 
Princeton, N . J . , 1988 . 
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stand and fight, if need be, was made on March 24, 1939, i.e., six days before 
Britain gave her guarantee to Poland. 1 4 
* * * 
Now let us turn to the genesis of the British guarantee. At first sight, this 
guarantee seems rather strange, since the British government had always as-
sumed that Danzig and part of the Polish Corridor must some day return to 
Germany. Moreover, this view was shared by some French statesmen since 
1925, e.g., Aristide Briand. In point of fact, Britain did not guarantee the 
status of Free City or the territorial integrity of Poland, but the latter's indepen-
dence. Thus, Britain made a stand against treaty revision by force, not against 
revision as such. A stand was mandated by the outrage expressed by British 
public opinion at Hitler's seizure of the Czech lands in mid-March 1939. 
That is why Chamberlain and Halifax could not continue the old policy of 
appeasement. 1 5 In any case, the news of an alleged German ultimatum to 
Rumania dictated an immediate response. Therefore, prodded by Halifax, 
Chamberlain had to give up his original decision to continue to seek peace 
through appeasement, and publicly warned Hitler on March 17 that Britain 
would not tolerate any German move toward world domination. 1 6 Few noticed 
at the time that this was only a stronger version of the warnings he had made 
in his speech of September 27, 1938, at the height of the Czechoslovak crisis. 1 7 
As we know, the Munich conference took place two days later. 
Britain's first step to check further German aggression was anything but 
daring. Chamberlain proposed that Britain, France,-.the USSR, and Poland, 
sign a declaration to consult together in case of a renewed threat of German 
aggression. On the urging of the French ambassador in London, Charles Cor-
bin, the phrase was amended to consult on action to be taken. As we know, 
this project fell through, but this was due not only to Polish opposition. It is 
true that Jozef Beck argued Poland could not sign because, in Hitler's eyes, 
this would put her on the Soviet side and possibly provoke him to aggression. 
More important was British distrust of Soviet Russia, which was shared by 
1 4 See : Ciencia la , Poland and the Western Powers, c h . VI , VII , and same , article in Zeszyty 
Historyczne, no . 7 5 . 
1 5 On Aristide Briand and revision of the Danz ig sett lement and the Pol ish-German frontier, 
see Anna M . Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki , From Versailles to Locarno. Keys to Polish Foreign 
Policy, 1919-1925, Lawrence , K s . , 1984 , pp. 2 4 0 - 4 5 . For British pol icy-makers ' reactions to 
Hit ler's seizure of the Czech lands, see Oliver Harvey 's note of 14 March 1939 in: John Harvey , 
e d . , The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937-1940, London , 1970 , pp. 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; for Cham-
berlain's speech of 15 March 1939 , on continuing appeasement , see Parliamentary Debates. 
House of Commons, (henceforth Pari. Deb. H.C.) 5th ser . , v . 3 4 5 , co l s . 4 3 8 - 4 0 . 
1 6 Keith Fei l ing, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, L o n d o n , 1946 , p. 3 6 2 . 
X1DBFP, 3rd ser . , v . II, no . 1111 . 
204 The Polish Review 
both the Dominions and neutral countries. Finally, Chamberlain wanted not 
war, but a peaceful settlement with Germany. For the same reasons, Britain 
rejected the Soviet proposal of a conference between the interested Powers. 1 8 
It is important to note that even before launching the consultation scheme, 
Chamberlain saw Poland as "very likely the key to the situation." 1 9 It appears 
that initially Poland's participation in the projected declaration was meant to 
encourage the Balkan states to stand up to Hitler. Their independence was 
seen as a vital British interest in order to block German access to the eastern 
Mediterranean, for this would threaten British communications through the 
Suez Canal to India and the Far East. 2 0 Next, Britain saw Rumania's indepen-
dence as vital, since otherwise Rumanian oil and grain would fall into German 
hands, thus undermining the naval blockade Britain planned to impose on 
Germany at the outset of war. 
Since Poland bordered on Rumania and had a defensive alliance with her 
against the USSR, the British and French governments wanted this treaty 
extended into an alliance against Germany. However, Beck steadfastly op-
posed this course, arguing that it would push Hungary into the arms of Berlin. 2 1 
(This was, indeed, a real possibility given the Hungarian demand for the return 
of Transylvania). Finally, and most important from the British point of view, 
Poland had a long frontier with Germany and was regarded as the strongest 
military power in Eastern Europe. (Here we should recall that a Soviet offen-
sive capability was discounted after Stalin's purge of the Soviet officer corps 
in 1937-38). Thus, Chamberlain believed that if Poland aligned herself with 
France and Britain, Germany would face the risk of a two front war, and he 
thought it impossible for Hitler or his generals to risk a repeat performance of 
1918. 2 2 
Thus, when instead of signing the declaration on consultation, Jozef Beck 
proposed a bilateral secret Anglo-Polish agreement on consultation to ambas-
sador Howard Kennard on March 22, 1939, and ambassador Edward Raczyri-
1 8 For B e c k ' s attitude, see Cienciala , Poland and the Western Powers, ch . VII; for an account 
o f other reactions and on Soviet proposals , see Aster, 1939, ch . 3 , 4 . 
1 4 Cabinet C o n c l u s i o n s , 18 March 1939 , C A B / 9 8 , p. 5 9 , Public Record Office ( P R O ) , London . 
2 0 S e e remarks by Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newal l o f 17 March 1939 , cit . Aster , 1939, p . 
119 . 
2 1 O n Rumania , see French v i e w , B e c k ' s instructions of Juliusz L u k a s i e w i c z , the Pol ish ambassa-
dor in Paris , and his conversation with Premier Edouard Daladier, 2 3 March, 1939 , Diplomat in 
Paris 1936-1939. Papers and Memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Ambassador of Poland, edited by 
W a c l a w Jedrzejewicz , N e w York, 1970 , pp. 1 7 5 - 7 8 . 
2 2 Former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George passed on to Soviet ambassador Ivan 
Maiski i what Chamberlain had told him on 31 March 1939 , when he asked why he had g iven a 
guarantee to Poland. Chamberlain said: " . . . according to the information at his d isposal , neither 
the German General Staff nor Hitler would ever risk war if they k n e w that they would have to 
fight s imultaneous ly on t w o fronts—the West and the East ," see Maiski i report of 31 March 1939 
in Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II, 2nd printing, M o s c o w , 1976 , n o . 138. 
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ski formally proposed it to Lord Halifax two days later, 2 3 this fitted the already 
existing British perception of Poland as "the key to the situation." Therefore, 
Beck's proposal—which was accepted by Halifax—led on March 27 to the 
recommendation of the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee, which was ac-
cepted by the Cabinet two days later, that Britain offer a guarantee to Poland. 
The Cabinet decided that this offer be made conditional on Poland's guarantee 
to help Rumania, and on a reciprocal Polish guarantee to Britain. However, if 
Poland would not, or could not, accept the above conditions, she would be 
offered a unilateral British guarantee—since there could be no "Eastern Front" 
without her. 2 4 While the original British intent was to use Poland as the core 
of an Eastern Front to be created by adding Rumania, Greece, and also perhaps 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, ultimately this proved to be impossible and the larger 
project was abandoned. 
The above-cited Cabinet decision proves that the guarantee was not some-
thing conceived on the spur of the moment. Thus it was not offered as a direct 
reaction to the "news" brought by the journalist Ian Colvin from Berlin on 
March 29 that Germany was about to attack Poland. In fact, Colvin's informa-
tion had been known to British Intelligence for a month. It was rather the 
expected effect of this news on British public opinion that made Chamberlain 
decide on the evening of March 29 to offer the guarantee immediately to 
Poland. 2 5 Even then, there was some doubt about this when German intent to 
attack Poland was not confirmed, and when the British and French ambassa-
dors in Warsaw reported the German terms which Poland had rejected, i.e., 
the return of Danzig to Germany and German extraterritorial communications 
through the Corridor. 2 6 However, after a brief hesitation, it was decided to 
proceed with the guarantee, because British public opinion demanded a firm 
stand against Hitler. 2 7 
Was the British guarantee designed—as Simon Newman claims—to prevent 
2 3 S e e Ciencia la , Poland and the Western Powers, pp. 2 1 6 - 1 7 ; the initiative for a secret Ang lo -
Pol ish agreement has been incorrectly attributed to Hal i fax , see Prazmowska , Britain, Pol 
and the Eastern Front, pp. 4 6 - 4 7 . 
2 4 C a b i n e t Commit tee on Foreign Po l i cy , F .P . ( 3 6 ) , 38th meet ing , 27 March 1939 , 5 p . i n . , 
C A B 2 7 / 6 2 4 , (PRO) pp . 1 9 9 - 2 0 4 , partly cit . Aster , 1939, p . 9 2 , and N e w m a n , March 1939, pp. 
1 5 1 - 5 2 . 
2 5 S e e David Di lks , e d . , The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945, London , 1 9 7 1 , 
entry for 2 9 March 1939 , p. 165. 
2 6 K e n n a r d to Hal i fax, 29 March 1939 , D B F P , 3rd ser. v . IV, no . 5 6 4 (10 :10 p . m . ) , and N o e l 
to Bonnet , same day , D D F , 2nd ser. v. X V I , 188. 
2 7 Ambassador Edward Raczyriski was told on the morning of 3 0 March, that no public an-
nouncement would be made unless there was reason to fear that Germany contemplated immediate 
act ion. H o w e v e r in the afternoon, Sir Orme Sargent informed the ambassador of the projected 
guarantee, and said a speedy Polish reply w a s essential in v i e w of increasing attacks on Chamber-
lain for his lack of initiative in face of German aggress ion . Ambassador Kennard was then 
instructed to obtain B e c k ' s agreement , if poss ib le , at o n c e — s e e Ciencia la , Poland and the West-
ern Powers, pp. 2 2 5 - 2 6 . 
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a Polish-German settlement and thus provoke a war with Germany, in which 
Poland would fight on Britain's side? The reader can decide this for himself 
by first looking at the conditions originally appended to the guarantee by 
the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy on the morning of March 31 , at 
Chamberlain's statement to the Cabinet at noon that day—both of which are 
cited by Newman—and finally at British and French policy between April and 
September 1939. As far as the first point is concerned, the Committee on 
Foreign Policy resolved that the guarantee was to be implemented on two 
conditions: (1) if Poland resisted a threat to her independence; (2) if she did 
not indulge in "provocative or stupid obstinacy," either generally, or on Danzig 
in particular. 2 8 Secondly, at noon, Chamberlain told the Cabinet that: "It 
would, of course, be for us to determine what action threatened Polish indepen-
dence. This would prevent us from becoming embroiled as the result of a 
frontier incident." 2 9 
We should note that the first condition was amended to read that Poland 
would resist a threat to her independence with her "national forces." As Halifax 
explained to the French leaders in late May, this formula was intended to 
restrain Poland. In his words: "as far as Poland was concerned, safety lay in 
the fact that, in the event of trouble, Poland would obviously be the first to 
suffer and suffer disastrously." 3 0 Thus, the Polish Government would think 
long and hard before deciding to mobilize to meet a German threat. We should 
also note that when Chamberlain announced the guarantee in the House of 
Commons on the afternoon of March 31 , he first made a long statement to the 
effect that no question was incapable of solution by peaceful means, and that 
the offer to Poland was an interim measure while negotiations proceeded on a 
multilateral declaration on consultation. Only then did he state that if Poland 
resisted a threat to her independence with her national forces, then the British 
Government "would feel themselves to be bound at once to lend the Polish 
Government all the support in their power." He added that France associated 
herself with this offer.3 1 
As we know from British documents, the immediate objectives of the guar-
antee were twofold: (a) to warn Hitler against using force, and (b) to pave the 
way to a bilateral Anglo-Polish agreement on mutual aid. This agreement 
was concluded between Foreign Minister Beck and the British government in 
London on April 6. It was accompanied by a secret protocol, one point of 
which stated that British aid against any kind of German threat to Poland's 
2 8 C a b i n e t Commit tee on Foreign Po l i cy , F .P . ( 3 6 ) , 40th meet ing , 31 March 1939 , 9:45 a . m . , 
C A B 2 7 / 6 2 4 , cit. N e w m a n , March 1939, p. 2 0 2 . 
2 9 Cabinet Minutes , 31 March 1939 , C A B / 9 8 , cit . N e w m a n , ibid. 
M ) Extract from record o f conversat ions be tween the Secretary of State and M M . Daladier and 
Bonnet at the Ministry o f War, Paris, May 2 0 , 1 9 3 9 , D B F P , 3rd ser. v . V , no . 5 6 9 , p. 6 1 0 , and 
French r££prd in D D F , 2nd ser. v. X V I , no . 2 4 3 , pp. 4 8 2 - 8 3 . 
31 Pari. Deb. H.C., 5th sr. v. 3 4 5 , c o l s . 2 4 2 1 - 4 2 ; cit . Aster , 1939, pp. 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 . 
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independence—which Poland would resist with her national forces—was un-
derstood to include a German threat to Danzig. Soon thereafter, Beck informed 
the British Government that, as it had requested, Poland would come to its aid 
if it became involved in war by helping Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. 3 2 
Nevertheless, the formal alliance was delayed until August 25. The reason 
for this delay was the British goal of attaining a peaceful Polish-German settle-
ment and, in the meanwhile, concluding a treaty with the USSR. This was to 
serve as an additional incentive for Hitler to sign an agreement with Poland 
but, if it failed, the USSR was to help defend Poland and Rumania. Therefore, 
the British aim was to transform the Franco-Soviet alliance of 1935 into a 
triple alliance. However, while the French viewed such an alliance as the 
ultimate deterrent to Hitler, the British were somewhat skeptical. In any case, 
the key problem was that neither Poland nor Rumania, nor the Baltic States— 
which the USSR was also to "protect"—wanted Soviet guarantees of aid, and 
even less, the entry of Soviet troops. However, both Poland and Rumania 
were willing to accept Soviet military supplies in case of war. 3 3 
* * * 
Now let us see how the British and French governments envisaged the 
negotiated Polish-German settlement which was their goal. It is significant 
that from the outset, Halifax differentiated clearly between a change in the 
3 2 A g o o d summary o f British object ives is g i v e n by C a d o g a n , see: Diaries, p . 166; for the text 
o f the secret Ang lo -Po l i sh agreement o f 6 April 1 9 3 9 , see D B F P ^ r d . ser . , v . V , n o . 16; Pol i sh 
text in Jôzef Zaranski, é d . , Diariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka (1935-1945), v . IV , L o n d o n , 1 9 7 2 , 
pp . 7 1 6 - 1 8 ; for B e c k ' s declaration o f Pol ish aid to Britain, see Kennard to Hal i fax, 14 Apri l , 
1 9 3 9 , D B F P , v . V , no . 164 . 
Part II, art. 2 , par (b) of the secret agrément o f 6 April stated that if Germany tried to undermine 
Pol ish independence by e c o n o m i c penetration, or in any other w a y , the British government w o u l d 
support Pol i sh resistance. If the Germans then attacked Po land , Britain w o u l d immediate ly c o m e 
to her aid. In case o f other German action w h i c h clearly threatened Pol ish independence , and 
w a s of such a character that the Pol ish government w o u l d cons ider it its vital interest to resist 
with its armed forces , then the British government w o u l d c o m e immediate ly to its aid. 
Jôzef Potocki , then a member of B e c k ' s negotiat ing team in L o n d o n and Head o f the Western 
Dept . in the Pol ish Foreign Ministry, no doubt had this par. in mind w h e n he wrote to Edward 
Raczynski in 1957 , recall ing that on the third day o f negot iat ions , w h e n Beck was out o f L o n d o n , 
h e , together with Raczynski negotiated with Alexander Cadogan and Wi l l iam Strang. Potocki 
and Raczynski insisted that certain sentences be redrafted in such a w a y as to leave no doubt that a 
German attack on Danz ig territory w a s s y n o n y m o u s with an attack on Poland. Cadogan instructed 
Malkin (the F . O . Legal Adviser) to redraft the protocol a c c o r d i n g l y — s e e Edward Raczynski , W 
sojuszniczym Londynie, 1st e d . , London , 1 9 6 2 , pp. 4 1 2 - 1 3 ; 2nd e d . , L o n d o n , 1974 , ibid; s ee 
a lso English edi t ion, In Allied London, London , 1 9 6 2 , note 2 . 
3 3 For a survey of A n g l o - S o v i e t negot iat ions , see Aster , 1939, ch . 6 , 10, 13; on French efforts, 
see Durose l l e , Décadence, ch . XIII, X V : for the Pol ish s ide , see "Polish Diplomat ic D o c u m e n t s 
Concerning Negot ia t ions B e t w e e n Great Britain, France, and the Sov ie t Union Before the Out-
break o f the Second World War," (in Pol i sh) , General Sikorski Historical Institute, London , 
1 9 5 5 , and offprint, Bellona, London , Jan-March, 1955 . 
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status of the Free City of Danzig on the one hand, and a threat to Polish 
independence on the other. He first presented this basic formula to Soviet 
ambassador Ivan Maiskii on March 19, i.e., before Britain gave her guarantee 
to Poland. Halifax then told him that if the Danzig question developed into a 
threat to Polish independence, then the matter "would be of interest to us al l ." 3 4 
Nine days later, he told French ambassador Charles Corbin that Poland should 
not be forced to face just two alternatives, namely agreement with either Ger-
many or the Soviet Union. A third alternative would be Polish-German negoti-
ations, assented to by the Western Powers—if German demands should go 
beyond Danzig. 3 5 Thus, from the beginning, Halifax envisaged the return of 
Danzig to Germany. 
British government thinking was reflected in the Times editorial of April 1, 
which stated that the British guarantee to Poland did not mean a blind accep-
tance of existing Polish frontiers, but that it guaranteed Polish independence. 
Two days later, the editor, Geoffrey Dawson, noted in his diary that both 
Chamberlain and Halifax thought the article "just right on first reading and 
were only worried by the Poles and others." 3 6 Indeed, earlier reports along the 
lines of Dawson's editorial had led Beck to threaten the cancellation of his 
impending visit to London. Although the Foreign Office issued a statement 
that the Times did not express the views of the government, 3 7 Dawson's diary 
entry proves that it did. 
On April 6, i.e., on the day the Anglo-Polish agreement was signed in 
London, Frank Roberts of the Central Department of the Foreign Office— 
which included Poland—commented that since Beck's hand had been 
"strengthened," he might not be unwilling to discuss Danzig and a German 
road across the Corridor with the Germans. 3 8 Two weeks later, the same 
thought was expressed to ambassador Edward Raczynski by the Permanent 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, when he said 
the Poles should not be "intransigent" now that Britain had guaranteed them. 3 9 
At the same time, Halifax cabled Kennard in Warsaw that the guarantee should 
strengthen Beck's bargaining position, and that everything must be done to 
avoid the impression that the guarantee had made a reasonable settlement 
difficult. 4 0 These statements, along with those made by the British ambassador 
in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, and by Chamberlain's closest adviser, Sir 
3 4 D B F P , 3rd ser. v . IV , no . 4 3 2 . 
3 5 Corbin to Bonnet , 28 March 1 9 3 9 , D D F , 2nd ser. v . X V , no . 176. 
3 6 Geof frey D a w s o n diary, 3 April 1939 , cit. Franklin Reid G a n n o n , The British Press and 
Germany, 1936-39, Oxford, 1 9 7 1 , p. 2 2 ff. 
3 7 Cit. Ciencia la , Poland and the Western Powers, pp. 2 2 6 - 2 7 ; E . Raczynsk i , In Allied London, 
p. 14. 
3 8 Minute by Frank Roberts , 6 April 1939 , F . O . 3 7 1 / 2 3 0 1 6 / C 4 8 7 0 / 5 4 / 1 8 , ( P R O ) . 
3 9 C a d o g a n , Diaries, 2 0 April 1939 , p. 176. 
4 0 Halifax to Kennard, 2 0 April 1 9 3 9 , D B F P , 3rd ser. v. V , no . 2 3 7 . 
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Horace Wilson, 4 1 clearly indicate that British policy-makers aimed at a Polish-
German settlement satisfactory to Hitler. Here we should note that while Beck 
also envisaged Polish-German negotiations, he refused to accept terms con-
trary to Poland's vital interests. Thus, on April 23, he warned ambassador 
Kennard that Poland would not negotiate on the basis of the German demands 
which she had rejected, and this regardless of what Britain might do . 4 2 How-
ever, this warning was ignored in London. 
Let us now turn to French policy. As we noted earlier, some French politi-
cians had long assumed that Danzig would return some day to Germany. 
Indeed, after 1925, many viewed the Polish alliance as less of an asset than a 
burden. Also, many French officials nursed a great distrust and dislike of Jozef 
Beck, whom they saw as being pro-German. 4 3 While this view stemmed from 
Beck's maintenance of good relations with Germany and from his sometimes 
exaggerated independence from France, we should bear in mind that in 1938 
the French had little compunction in abandoning President Edward Benes and 
Czechoslovakia, even though he had always been subservient to Paris and the 
country was an ally of France. 
As we know, France, which was Poland's ally since 1921, joined in the 
British guarantee of March 31 , 1939. Furthermore, impressed by the Anglo-
Polish agreement of April 6—of which the French government received only 
a summary, since Halifax and Beck agreed not to communicate the text to 
Paris for fear of leakage, and thus rousing Hitler's ire—it responded positively 
to the Polish request that the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921 be updated to 
conform to the new Anglo-Polish accord. On May 11, the French Cabinet 
unanimously approved a draft protocol interpreting the alliance of 1921, along 
with an appended declaration by ambassador Juliusz Lukasiewicz, which France 
4 1 S e e Henderson letter to Sir Horace W i l s o n , 9 M a y 1939 , P R E M / I / 3 3 1 A , and statement in 
Cabinet o f 2 6 A u g . 1939 , cit . Aster , 1939, p . 3 4 2 . (For more on H. W i l s o n , see b e l o w . ) 
4 2 Kennard to Hal i fax, 2 3 April 1 9 3 9 , D B F P , v . V , no . 2 7 4 ; the full Pol ish text o f the conversa-
tion is in Joze f Potocki to Edward Raczynsk i , 2 4 April 1 9 3 9 , no . 4 9 / W B / t j . Encl . 1, part I . , 
Arch ives o f the Pol ish E m b a s s y , L o n d o n , Pol ish Institute and Sikorski M u s e u m (henceforth 
P I S M ) , London . 
4 3 T h u s , A l e x i s Leger , Secretary General o f the French Foreign Ministry, be l ieved the return 
o f Danz ig to Germany was "a foregone c o n c l u s i o n , and there w a s no reason for France and Great 
Britain to take action to prevent it," Phipps to Hal i fax , 18 March 1939 , D B F P , 3rd ser. v . IV, 
n o . 4 1 8 , encl . p. 3 8 2 . On the same day , Leger told Phipps that he knew from a "confidential" 
source that B e c k ' s aim w a s to ask London for an A n g l o - P o l i s h al l iance, knowing that this w a s 
imposs ib le . He would then use the British refusal to justify leaning toward Germany , even at the 
cost o f b e c o m i n g her vassal , ibid., no . 4 0 5 , p. 3 7 3 . 
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was to take note of, that Danzig was "a vital Polish interest." 4 4 The political 
protocol was to be signed on May 19, the day on which protocols interpreting 
the Franco-Polish Military Convention of February 1921, were also to be 
signed by the Chief of the French General Staff, General Maurice Gamelin, 
and the Polish War Minister, General Tadeusz Kasprzycki. But French Foreign 
Minister Georges Bonnet suddenly asked ambassador Lukasiewicz for a delay 
in signing the political protocol. What had happened? 
First of all, Bonnet belatedly decided to ask London whether the Anglo-
Polish agreement of April 6 included the statement that Danzig was a vital 
Polish interest. Although the Foreign Office reaction to this question was 
favorable, Bonnet agreed to await a definite reply from Lord Halifax, who 
was due in Paris on May 20 . 4 5 On that day, Halifax told Bonnet and Premier 
Edouard Daladier—who was also Minister of Defense—that there was no such 
statement in the agreement of April 6. While this was literally true, Halifax 
concealed the fact that in the secret Anglo-Polish understanding, any kind of 
German threat to Poland's independence, which she considered her vital inter-
est to resist with her national forces, would bring about immediate British aid, 
and that this could be read to include Danzig. What is more, Halifax went on 
to outline a plan of settlement. Danzig, he said, would return to Germany, but 
retain its status as a Free City; that is, it would have neither fortifications, nor 
be occupied by German troops. It would be administered like a German city 
and might even have a representative in the Reichstag. (Here Halifax said his 
impression was that Beck was primarily concerned with the continued exis-
tence of Danzig as Free City.) Next, this settlement, in which Poland's rights 
were to be safeguarded, would be secured by an international guarantee. When 
Daladier asked about the German demand for extraterritorial communications 
through the Corridor, Halifax replied this issue could not be negotiated at the 
moment; later, when the time was right, he thought the "good offices" of the 
Pope or the Italian government might be requested to help mediate an agree-
ment. Daladier demurred that Italy was too closely tied with Germany, saying 
he would prefer mediation by the Vatican. 4 6 (In fact, the Vatican had made a 
move in this direction in early May, while both the Pope and Mussolini were 
to try their hand with the Polish government in late August 1939.) Thus, on 
May 20, the French and British governments agreed to work for a settlement 
whereby Danzig would return to Germany, and the latter would get an extrater-
ritorial connection with Danzig and East Prussia through the Polish Corridor. 
4 4 For the Beck-Hal i fax agreement to keep the text of the Ang lo -Po l i sh agreement o f 6 April 
secret from the French, see Cypher telegram to H . M . Minister, Paris, 7 April 1939 , F . O . 3 7 1 / 
2 3 0 1 6 / C 5 0 6 3 / 5 4 / 1 8 ( PRO ) . For the French Cabinet resolution o f 11 May 1939 , see Bonnet to 
Daladier , 18 M a y 1939 , D D F , 2nd ser. v. X V I , no . 2 2 ; for the Pol ish summary of the negot iat ions , 
see Diplomat in Paris, pp. 2 0 2 - 2 0 . 
4 5 S e e D D F , 2nd ser. v . X V , n o s . 2 1 1 , 2 1 7 , 2 2 6 , 2 2 8 . 
^ F o r T h e Hal i fax-Daladier-Bonnet conversat ion o f 2 9 M a y 1939 , see note 3 0 above . 
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We should note that while the Polish government had rejected these terms in 
March, they had always been considered by British statesmen—and indeed by 
some French ones, e.g., Aristide Briand—as a reasonable solution to the Dan-
zig-Corridor problem. This was also the case with Leger, Bonnet, and Daladier 
in 1939. 
It is clear that the Bonnet-Daladier agreement to Halifax's plan led to the 
postponement of the Franco-Polish agreements. In fact, on May 20, the very 
day of the Halifax-Bonnet-Daladier conversation, gen. Gamelin wrote gen? 
Kasprzycki that the military protocols they had signed the previous day would 
not assume the character of an agreement between the two General Staffs until 
the political agreement was signed. 4 7 As it turned out, the latter was not signed 
until September 4, 1939, when the Polish-German war was in its fourth day, 
and France was in its first day of war with Germany. (The contents of the 
Franco-Polish military protocols will be discussed later, along with British and 
French military commitments to Poland.) 
Thus, the Halifax-Bonnet-Daladier agreement of May 20 differed from Hit-
ler's terms only in two respects: (a) the continued existence of Danzig as Free 
City—this time within the Reich—and an international guarantee. Chamber-
lain mentioned such a solution for Danzig, when he spoke to a group of Labour 
members of Parliament in June, and again to General Sir Edmund Ironside on 
the eve of his departure to Poland in July. 4 8 
* * * 
It is impossible in this short paper to follow all the ins and outs of British 
policy toward Germany in the summer of 1939. Suffice it to say that repeated 
British warnings to Hitler and repeated declarations of support for Poland, 
were more than balanced by unofficial Anglo-German conversations. Even if 
Helmuth Wohlthat did not obtain a memorandum from Sir Horace Wilson 
outlining a comprehensive Anglo-German agreement (July), such an agree-
ment may well have been discussed. 4 9 In any case, on August 3, Sir Horace 
Wilson mentioned such a settlement to German ambassador Herbert von Dirk-
sen. On this occasion Wilson said that if Germany agreed to negotiate and 
signed a declaration of nonaggression with Great Britain—the latter would 
4 7 S e e Pol ish protest and Gamel in letter to Kasprzycki , D D F , 2nd ser. v . X V I , nos . 2 4 4 , 2 4 5 . 
4 8 Hugh Dal ton , the Labour Party expert on Foreign Affairs , told a m b . Raczyriski that Chamber-
lain spoke o f a poss ible Pol ish-German compromise on D a n z i g , which might be mediated by the 
League High C o m m i s s i o n e r , Burckhardt, and be secured by an international guarantee—Raczyri-
ski report to B e c k , 3 0 June 1939 , ER/MR no. 4 9 / W B / t j / 3 5 1 , Pol ish E m b a s s y , London , P I S M . 
In early July, Chamberlain told Sir Edmund Ironside, Inspector General o f Overseas Forces , w h o 
was go ing to Poland, that he env isaged the return of D a n z i g to Germany as a Free City , see 
Frederick M a c L e o d and Den i s Ke l ly , e d s . , Time Unguarded. The Ironside Diaries, 1937-1940, 
L o n d o n , 1962 , p. 7 7 . 
4 9 S e e Helmuth Metzmacher , "Deutsch-Engl i sche A u s g l e i c h b e m ü h e n g e n in S o m m e r 1939 ," 
Verteljahrshefte für Zeitsgeschichte, v. X I V , no . 4 , October 1956. 
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withdraw her guarantees from Poland, Greece, and Rumania. 5 0 (The last two 
countries received guarantees on April 17, after Mussolini's invasion of Alba-
nia.) We may assume that instead of encouraging Hitler to think of negotia-
tions, this proposal helped convince him that Britain would not honor her 
commitments to Poland. 
Another encouraging sign for the Fuhrer was the niggardly British attitude 
on financial aid to Poland. Instead of giving the latter a sign of support by 
public agreement to the sizable sum she requested, Halifax and Chamberlain 
allowed the Treasury to pare it down to a ludicrously small amount. In fact, 
the negotiations were even suspended, and only concluded later. It is true that 
Britain had to husband her financial resources, but her parsimonious attitude 
confirmed Hitler's view that she would not go to war for Poland. Indeed, the 
Treasury clearly viewed Poland as a poor risk; one of the conditions of the 
loan as finally granted was that the gold of the Bank of Poland should be 
located abroad, to be accessible in case of war. 5 1 It would have been better 
politics to announce that Britain would help Poland to the hilt, and that the 
loan was only a first installment. However, if this was suggested in London, 
it must have been rejected. 
Returning to Sir Horace Wilson's proposal of August 3 to ambassador Dirk-
sen, Hitler's answer was finally delivered on August 20 by Fritz Hesse, the 
German press attaché in London. Acting on Ribbentrop's instructions, Hesse 
told Wilson that Hitler sjood by his demands for Danzig and extraterritorial 
communications through the Corridor, but he might be willing to "negotiate" 
with Poland on the basis of his March demands (which Poland had rejected). 5 2 
Perhaps this message sparked plans for Goring's secret visit to England. What-
ever the case may be, the date was set for August 23. However, the Nazi-
5 0 Note by Sir Horace Wi l son on a conversat ion with Ambassador Dirksen, 3 August 1939 , 
D B F P , 3rd ser. v . V I , n o . 5 3 3 . According to Dirksen ' s report o f the same day , W i l s o n conf irmed 
the accuracy o f the notes Dirksen had taken on the W i l s o n - W o h l July conversat ions , see Docu-
ments and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War, M o s c o w , 1948 , v . II, no . 2 4 , 
and Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II, no . 3 0 2 . Dirksen's memorandum w a s not 
found in the German Foreign Ministry A r c h i v e s — s e e Documents on German Foreign Policy, 
ser. D , v. V I , no . 7 6 6 , note . The Sovie ts most l ikely found the document a m o n g those they 
captured in Germany at war's end. 
5 1 For a short survey o f the Ang lo -Po l i sh financial negot iat ions , see David E. Kaiser, Economic 
Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War. Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern 
Europe, 1930-1939, Princeton, N . J . , 1980 , pp. 3 0 5 - 0 9 . For more detail , see Prazmowska . 
Britain, Poland, and the Eastern Front, 1939, c h . 5 . 
52£ee~H. W i l s o n ' s note o f 2 0 August 1939 , P R E M / I / 3 3 1 / A ( P R O ) , also Aster, 1939, pp. 2 5 8 -
5 9 . ' 
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Soviet Pact was signed that day and the visit was cancelled. 5 3 
Here we should note that when the Soviets demanded in mid-August that 
Poland and Rumania agree to the passage of Soviet troops, and, indeed, made 
this agreement the condition for further negotiations with the Anglo-French 
Military Mission in Moscow, Stalin knew that Hitler was anxious to sign an 
agreement with him. Moreover, when the Poles refused this demand, Daladier 
instructed the head of the French mission in Moscow to give his consent. But 
French agreement was not enough for Stalin and the talks broke down on the 
pretext of Polish and Rumanian obduracy. The Anglo-French Military Mission 
was still in Moscow when Ribbentrop arrived on August 23 and signed the 
German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact with Molotov. As we know, the secret 
protocol appended to this pact included the partition of Poland between Ger-
many and the USSR. 5 4 
The announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact did not change the dual line of 
Franco-British policy, that is, of warning Hitler against using force, while at 
the same time working for a Polish-German settlement which would satisfy 
the Fuhrer. However, after August 23, it was this second goal which was 
pursued with desperate urgency by London. Paris maintained an attitude of 
passivity, except for Daladier's extraordinary letter to Hitler of August 26, in 
which the Frenchman offered his "help" in reaching a Polish-German settle-
ment. Hitler, however, would have none of i t . 5 5 On August 25, the Anglo-
Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance was finally signed, but even on this occa-
sion Halifax told ambassador Raczynski that it was essential to differentiate 
between the Free City of Danzig on the one hand, and Polish territory on the 
other. He also warned that it would be "unwise" for the Polish government to 
reject any conversations about the Free City with Berlin. Finally, he said that 
5 3 On Goring vis i t , see Cadogan , Diaries, p. 199 , note. Sydney Cotton, an Australian ac 
photography special ist and pi lot , working for British Air Inte l l igence, was sent to Berlin to p i - j^ 
up Gor ing , but met with incredul i ty—see Woermann note , 23 August 1939 , D G F P , ser. D , v . 
VII , n o . 2 2 1 , a l so F . H . Hins l ey , E . E . T h o m a s , C . F . G . R a n s o m , and R . C . Knight , British 
Intelligence in the Second World War. Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Cambridge , 
N e w York, 1 9 7 9 , v. I, A p p . II, pp. 4 9 6 - 9 9 , where Cotton's visit to Berlin on 2 2 A u g . is 
ment ioned , but not its purpose. 
5 4 For A n g l o - S o v i e t negot iat ions in M o s c o w , see Aster, 1939, ch . 10, and Durose l le , Deca-
dence, c h . XII , 5; for Pol ish d o c u m e n t s , see note 33 above; for German-Sovie t talks from May 
to August 1939 , see Gerhard L. Weinberg , The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany. Starting 
World War II, 1937-1939, C h i c a g o , L o n d o n , 1 9 8 0 , pp. 6 0 2 - 0 8 . For a sympathetic v i e w o f 
Sov ie t po l i cy , see Jonathan Has lam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security 
in Europe, 1933-1939, N e w York, 1984 , ch . 10, a lso Teddy J. Uldricks , "A.J .P . Taylor and the 
Russ ians ," in G. Martel , e d . , The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, ch . 7. 
5 5 S e e Le Livre Jaune Francais, Paris, 1939 , nos . 2 5 3 , 2 6 1 . 
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Polish interests in Danzig could be safeguarded by an international guarantee. 5 6 
This advice was particularly significant in view of the fact that on the previous 
day the leader of the Nazi Party in Danzig, Gauleiter Albert Forster, had 
proclaimed himself "head" of the government. Finally, the British government 
was well aware that the Free City was armed to the teeth and full of German 
soldiers, who had been arriving all summer disguised as "tourists." 
Another fact worth noting in connection with the Anglo-Polish treaty is 
Halifax's request to ambassador Raczynski that for "political effect" the treaty 
be signed no later than 5 p.m. that day, i.e., August 25 . 5 7 Perhaps this timing 
was selected to coincide with the expected time of arrival in Berlin of Musso-
lini's letter to Hitler, in which the Duce wrote that while Italy would support 
him in a war with Poland, she did not have the resources to be an active 
belligerent in a war with France and Britain. 5 8 Whether or not this letter was 
concocted with British support, we know that both Chamberlain and Halifax 
maintained close contact with Mussolini with the aim of securing his help in 
an eventual "mediation" between Poland and Germany. Indeed, on August 
24, Halifax had cabled the British ambassador in Rome, Sir Percy Loraine, 
the terms for a negotiated Polish-German settlement, and Loraine passed them 
on to Ciano. 5 9 This suited Mussolini, for the last thing he wanted was a war 
with the Western Powers, a war he beleived they were bound to win. 
The double blow dealt him by the conclusion of the Anglo-Polish alliance 
and by Mussolini, led Hitler to suspend his orders for the attack on Poland, 
scheduled to begin on August 26. He now indicated to the British that he was 
willing to "negotiate." This was not at all the result of Western "firmness," as 
Halifax told ambassador Raczynski that day, when advising him that the Polish 
government should not refuse negotiations if Hitler agreed to them. On the 
contrary, Raczynski was right in telling Halifax that Hitler's aim was to "break 
the resolution of the Western peoples." 6 0 Indeed, how could Hitler have been 
impressed by "Western firmness"? Aside from Wilson's declaration to ambas-
sador Dirksen and the readiness to welcome Goring in England, the British 
leaders were also using some British businessmen and, in particular, Birger 
Dahlerus, a Swedish businessman friend of Goring's, as secret intermediaries 
between the Marshal on the one hand, and Chamberlain and Halifax on the 
5 6 Hal i fax to Kennard, 2 6 A u g . 1939 , D B F P , 3rd ser. v . VII , no . 3 0 9 . For the Engl ish text o f 
the A n g l o - P o l i s h Treaty, see C o m m a n d Paper no . 6 6 1 6 , L o n d o n , 1945; for Engl ish and Pol ish 
T e x t s , s e e Diariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka, v . IV , pp . 7 6 7 - 6 8 , and for secret protocol (Eng l i sh ) , 
p . 7 6 9 . 
5 7 Raczynsk i to B e c k , cypher no . 176, 25 A u g . 1 9 3 9 , Cypher B o o k s , Pol ish E m b a s s y , L o n d o n , 
P I S M . 
5 8 For Musso l in i ' s letter to Hitler, see / Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, (henceforth I D D I ) , 
8th ser. v . XIII , no . 2 5 0 , and D G F P , ser. D , v . VII , no . 2 7 1 . 
5 9 N o t e from Loraine to C iano , 2 4 A u g . 1939 , I D D I , ibid., no . 2 0 5 , and Halifax to Loraine, 
D B F J ^ r d ser. v . VII , no . 2 2 2 . 
6 0 Hal i fax to Kennard, 2 6 A u g . 1939 , D B F P , ibid., no . 3 5 4 . 
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other. They hoped that Goring would use his alleged moderation to bring Hitler 
on to the path of peace. 
Taking Hitler at his word, Chamberlain and Halifax called in ambassador 
Kennard from Warsaw and ambassador Henderson from Berlin to help work 
out a suitable proposal for negotiations. Like Halifax's project of May 20, it 
was based on the German terms of March 21 , which had been rejected by 
Poland. In one of the many drafts of Chamberlain's letter to Hitler of August 
28, we even find a reference to this date, but it was dropped in favor of a 
reference to Hitler's speech of April 28, in which he had abrogated the Anglo-
German Naval Agreement of 1935. At the same time, he mentioned the terms 
he had offered to Poland and which she had rejected, saying they were no 
longer valid. However, he also stated that he recognized Polish rights and 
Polish independence. Therefore, Chamberlain asked whether Hitler still stood 
by his declaration of April 28, meaning both his terms of March 21 and his 
statement on Poland. In another draft of Chamberlain's letter, there was a 
proposal to hold a plebiscite in Danzig on the model of the Saar plebiscite held 
in 1935 under League of Nations supervision, which Germany had won. This 
suggestion was, however, dropped in the final text of the letter. Also, at the 
last moment Cadogan was able to delete a proposal—worked out by Halifax 
and Henderson—for an Anglo-German Nonaggression Pact. 6 1 
The core of the proposed settlement was put to the Cabinet by Chamberlain 
on August 27. Stating that according to Dahlerus, Hitler wanted not only 
Danzig but also the whole Polish Corridor, Chamberlain said that the most the 
Poles could concede was the return of Danzig to Gehnany and extraterritorial 
German communications across the Corridor. 6 2 Needless to say, the Poles had 
not been consulted; indeed, as noted earlier, Beck had warned Kennard in late 
April that they would refuse such conditions, regardless of what Britain.might 
do. Nevertheless, it was with this settlement in mind, that the British govern-
ment asked Beck to agree "in principle" to negotiations with Germany and to 
accept an international guarantee if a settlement was reached. Beck agreed, 
for he could not do otherwise. However, he made it quite clear that Poland* > 
"basic points" could not be compromised. He also told Kennard on August 
that he must demur from any inference that Poland would accept Hitler's 
terms. Finally, we should note that Beck gave his consent on the basis of a 
6 1 For drafts o f Chamberlain's letter to Hitler, see P R E M I / 3 3 1 A (PRO); see also Kaiser, Eco-
nomic Diplomacy, pp. 3 1 1 - 1 2 , and Cadogan , Diaries, 28 A u g . 1939 , p. 2 0 3 ; for text o f the 
letter, s ee D B F P , 3rd ser. v . VII , no . 4 9 8 (to Paris). 
6 2 Cabinet , 27 A u g . 1 9 3 9 , in Cabinet 4 4 ( 3 9 ) , C A B 2 1 / 1 0 0 ( P R O ) ; a lso D B F P , ibid., no . 6 4 9 ; 
for Cabinet Conc lus ions o f 2 6 - 2 7 A u g . 1939 , see Aster , 1939, pp . 3 4 2 - 4 4 . 
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summary of Chamberlain's letter to Hitler. 6 3 When Raczynski received the full 
text on August 31 , he cabled Beck that it bore the "stamp of appeasement." 
He also informed the Minister that Churchill and some other British politicians 
assured him they would oppose any attempt by Chamberlain to return to his 
old policy of making concessions to Germany. 6 4 Despite Beck's repeated re-
quests for an explanation of what the international guarantee would mean, he 
never received one. 
Hitler's first answer to Chamberlain's letter of August 28, which he gave 
orally to Henderson, was that he wanted not only Danzig and the Corridor, 
but also the Polish part of Upper Silesia. However, he then sent a written reply 
in which he accepted negotiations and an international guarantee, provided 
the USSR was one of the guarantors. But he also demanded that a Polish 
plenipotentiary arrive in Berlin by noon of August 30 . 6 5 The British were 
pleased but felt they could not accept the last demand; it was too redolent of 
President Hacha's visit to Berlin on the night his country was invaded. 
Despite this, some Cabinet members and officials actually thought that Hit-
ler's acceptance of negotiations and of the international guarantee meant they 
had him "on the run." Thus, Halifax and Cadogan thought Hitler was "in a 
fix." 6 6 In point of fact, Ribbentrop was right that Chamberlain's letter to Hitler 
indicated the British were looking for a way out. 6 7 Therefore, Halifax suffered 
from delusion in thinking that if negotiations began and the Western Powers 
were very stiff, "then Hitler would be beat." 6 8 In a more sober mood, the 
Foreign Secretary noted that while there might be no permanent peace in 
Europe as long as the Nazi regime lasted, this should not argue conclusively 
against "working for a peaceful solution on proper terms now." 6 9 What he 
meant, of course, were the terms for which he had obtained French agreement 
6 3 S e e D B F P , ibid., n o s . 4 1 1 , 4 4 3 ; for B e c k ' s m e s s a g e on no compromise on basic points , see 
W a r s a w cypher te legram n o . 2 5 4 , A u g . 2 8 , 1939 , rece ived by the Pol ish Embassy London via 
the Po l i sh E m b a s s y Paris , P I S M . For B e c k ' s demurral to Kennard, see latter to Hal i fax , 2 9 A u g . 
1 9 3 9 , D B F P , ibid., no . 4 8 7 . 
6 4 Raczynsk i to B e c k , cypher , 31 A u g . 1 9 3 9 , Pol ish Embassy London , P I S M . 
6 5 For the Hit ler-Henderson conversat ion o f 28 A u g . a .m. see D B F P , ibid., n o s . 4 5 5 , 4 9 0 , 
5 0 1 , and D G F P , D , VII , n o . 3 8 4 ; for Hitler's written reply, see D B F P , ibid., no . 5 0 2 , and D G F P , 
ibid., n o . 2 1 . Cadogan thought it looked "quite different and quite better," see Diaries, p . 2 0 4 ; 
H. W i l s o n noted it made "a m u c h less bad impress ion ," than the oral reply, see 2 9 A u g . PREMI/ 
331 A , ( P R O ) . H o w e v e r , Daladier thought it clearly s h o w e d the intention o f d i smember ing Po-
land, and refused to c o m e to London to d iscuss it, see D B F P , ibid., no . 5 3 3 . 
6 6 For Halifax remarks on basis o f Dahlerus report, see Cabinet 2 9 August 1939 , 11:30 a . m . , 
Cabinet 4 5 ( 3 9 ) , C A B 2 3 / 1 0 0 , partly cit . Aster , 1939, pp. 3 5 6 - 5 7 ; for "Hitler in a f ix ," see 
C a d o g a n , Diaries, 3 0 A u g . 1 9 3 9 , p. 2 0 5 . 
6 7 Ribbentrop to Italian ambassador Bernardo At to l i co , 2 9 A u g . 1 9 3 9 , D G F P , D , v . VII , no . 
4 1 1 . 
6 8 S e e Harvey , Diplomatic Diaries, 2 9 A u g . 1939 , p. 3 0 9 . 
M H a W ) r n o t e on memorandum by Ivone Kirkpatrick, and note by Orme Sargent, 3 0 A u g . 
1 9 3 9 , D B F P , ibid., no . 4 5 5 , p . 3 5 4 . 
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in May. We should note that in reply to Hitler, the British government made 
an "express reservation" on the Danzig-Corridor question—meaning it was 
not to be conceded outright but by negotiation—and stated they "understood" 
the German government was drawing up proposals for a solution. 7 0 However, 
Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador in London, indicated the true mood at 
10 Downing Street, when he reported Chamberlain as saying that he was more 
worried in getting the Poles to be "reasonable," than the Germans. 7 1 
Ribbentrop gave an oral reply to the British request for clarification of 
German policy, when he summoned ambassador Henderson to see him at 
midnight on August 30. He then gave him a fast reading of what was allegedly 
Hitler's "last offer." It consisted of sixteen points, the core of which was the 
return of Danzig to Germany and a plebiscite in the Corridor. However, only 
those could vote who were resident there in 1918. (This meant the return of 
Germans who had left for the purpose of voting and no vote for the Poles born 
or settled there since November 1918, though we should note that even then 
the Corridor had a Polish majority.) Whichever side won, would agree to the 
other having extraterritorial communications to the sea. 7 2 It was an offer nicely 
calculated to impress British opinion, as well as Western opinion in general, 
and isolate Poland if she refused. 
However, unlike 1938, the British and the French could not bully the Poles 
into accepting Hitler's terms. Any indication of bullying, no matter how rea-
sonable the terms might appear, risked an outburst of indignation in Britain 
not only from Churchill and his supporters, but also from all those who were 
disgusted with Munich. Nevertheless, no restraint^was put on ambassador 
Henderson when, allegedly in his own name, he harangued Jözef Lipski, the 
Polish ambassador in Berlin, that war must be avoided at all costs and exerted 
extreme pressure on him to get his government to "request" the transmission 
of German terms. Perhaps Henderson was allowed to go ahead because of his 
known pro-German attitude, but he was not restrained until Horace Wilson 
told him not to discuss the matter on the telephone, since the Germans were 
tapping the line. In any case, while Henderson was in contact with German 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernst von Weizsäcker and with 
7 0 S e e D G F P , D , v. VII , nos . 4 6 1 , 5 3 4 , 5 3 8 , 5 4 7 , 548 ; C a d o g a n , Diaries, p. 2 0 5 . 
7 1 Kennedy te legram, 3 0 Aug . 1939 , Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, I, (hence-
forth F R U S ) p . 3 9 2 . 
7 2 S ixteen points: D B F P , ibid., no . 6 2 2 ; D G F P , ibid., no . 4 5 8 . 
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his own superiors in London, 7 3 Halifax urged Warsaw to have regard for 
"world opinion" and to prepare for negotiations. 7 4 
Beck had no alternatives but to instruct Lipski that he request to see Ribben-
trop and inform him the Polish government was considering the German pro-
posals—that is, the gist of the sixteen points that Lipski had received from 
Henderson. The ambassador saw Ribbentrop on August 31 at 6 p.m., but 
when the latter heard that Lipski did not have full power to negotiate—i.e., 
accept the German terms—he ended the conversation. 7 5 On the same day, 
the Papal Nuncio in Warsaw, Monsignor Filippo Cortesi, urged the Polish 
government to declare its readiness to accept the return of Danzig to Germany 
and to enter into negotiations on the Corridor and on minority questions. In 
fact, this was the proposal suggested to the Vatican by Mussolini. The Polish 
government declined. 7 6 
However much Chamberlain might have liked to accept such a procedure, 
he could not do so, for in the British proposal Danzig was to be the subject of 
negotiations, i.e., the return of the city was to be conceded by Poland in a 
negotiated settlement. For this reason, Halifax insisted on such negotiations 
in his reply to Mussolini's suggestion of August 31 , that Danzig return to 
Germany prior to an international conference, which was to settle Germany's 
remaining demands on Poland as well as other European problems. 7 7 Neverthe-
less, even after Hitler's sixteen points had been communicated to the diplo-
matic corps in Berlin, and after the German radio had broadcast them, claiming 
they had been rejected by Poland, Halifax still urged the Polish government 
to accept negotiations. He also suggested that the League of Nations High 
Commissioner in Danzig, Dr. Carl J. Burckhardt, act as mediator. 7 8 As it 
happened, Halifax's last telegram, urging negotiations, was being deciphered 
in the British embassy in Warsaw when Hitler launched his attack on Poland 
at 4:30 a.m. on September 1, 1939. 
7 3 S e e , Diplomat in Berlin 1933-1939. Papers and Memoirs of Jözef Lipski, Ambassador of 
Poland, ed . W a c l a w Jçdrzejewicz , N e w York, 1 9 6 8 , pp. 5 6 9 - 7 3 ; for W e i z s ä c k e r s note o n te le-
phone conversat ion with Henderson, 31 A u g . 1 9 3 9 , 10:14 a . m . , see D G F P , ibid., n o s . 5 1 0 , 5 3 3 , 
5 9 7 ; Aster , 1939, pp . 3 6 0 - 6 2 . 
7 4 Hal i fax to Kennard, D B F P , ibid., nos . 5 3 9 , 5 5 2 , 5 7 6 , 5 9 6 , 6 0 0 , 6 0 8 - 0 9 ; a l so , handwritten 
Pol i sh note that First Secretary of the British E m b a s s y Warsaw, Robin Hankey , had te lephoned 
B e c k ' s of f ice at 8 a .m. 31 August , and message : cyphers , Pol ish Embassy L o n d o n , PISM; see 
a l so , F R U S 1 9 3 9 , I, pp. 3 9 0 - 9 1 . 
7 5 S e e Diplomat in Berlin, p . 6 1 0 ; D G F P , D , VII , no . 4 7 6 . 
7 6 S e e Actes et Documents du Saint-Siège et la Guerre en Europe, Mars 1939-Août 1939, 
Vat ican , 1970 , nos . 148 , 1 5 2 - 5 4 , 1 6 5 - 6 7 , 171; a l so , Diariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka, v. IV , pp. 
7 0 4 - 0 5 , and D B F P , 3rd. ser. v. VII , no . 5 2 6 . 
7 7 I^ajtfax-Ciano te lephone conversat ion, 31 A u g . 1939 , afternoon, D B F P , ibid., no . 6 2 7 . 
7 8 Halifax to Kennard, 31 A u g . 1939 , 11 p . m . , D B F P , ibid., no . 6 2 0 . 
Poland in British and French Policy in 1939 219 
Even Hitler's outright aggression did not stop Western efforts to save the 
peace. The French and British diplomatic notes delivered in Berlin on Septem-
ber 1, protested the aggression and threatened war—but only if the German 
government failed to "agree" to withdraw its troops from Poland, and failed 
to "express readiness" to negotiate. Moreover, no deadline was set for the 
German answer; on the contrary, to the German question whether the notes 
represented an ultimatum, the answer was that they did not. 7 9 In fact, the text 
of the notes—which had been fixed in late August—clearly left Hitler the 
opportunity to back out. And, indeed, there seemed to be a possibility for him 
to do so, when on August 31 Mussolini proposed an international conference 
to settle the Polish-German dispute, as well as other European problems. 
The French Cabinet seems at first to have rejected this offer, or at least 
Daladier appears to have done so. However, later that day, i.e., September 1, 
the French Cabinet informed Rome that it would accept the conference pro-
posal. We do not know how and why the French Cabinet reversed itself, if, 
indeed, it had been opposed in the first place. There are no Cabinet papers, 
only the memoirs of some participants, so the whole matter is unclear. 8 0 How-
ever, it appears that while the British government refused to consider either 
Polish-German negotiations or a conference without a prior withdrawal of 
German troops from Poland, the French government made no such condition. 
It has been argued that British delay in entering the war was due to French 
pleas for time. 8 1 While this was clearly a factor, it is also clear that the British 
leaders hoped against hope that Hitler would draw back from the brink of war. 
In any event, when an incomplete British Cabinet met on September 2 at 4:20 
p.m., Halifax reported on the Italian offer and his reply, and asked for agree-
ment to the time limit Hitler had requested from Mussolini to answer his 
proposal, i.e., the evening of September 3. This the Cabinet refused, setting 
the deadline for Hitler's answer to the British night for midnight that day, i.e., 
September 2. However, at the same time, the Cabinet agreed that Halifax 
should try to coordinate the deadline with the French government, and also 
endorsed the statements to be made that evening in Parliament by Chamberlain 
and Halifax. 8 2 But the French government asked for a delay of 48 hours, so 
Chamberlain and Halifax decided not to announce a deadline for Hitler's an-
swer. Therefore, speaking at 7 p.m. in the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords respectively, they explained that Hitler's answer to the British and 
French notes had not yet been received, and that this delay was probably due 
7 9 D B F P , ibid., no . 6 9 9 , and Henderson report o f 2 Sept. 1939 , no . 7 0 7 . 
8 0 For d i scuss ion and d o c u m e n t s , see Durose l l e , Decadence, pp. 4 8 1 - 8 6 , and Adamthwai te , 
France and the Coming of the Second World War, pp. 3 4 4 - 4 9 . 
8 1 S e e R . A . C . Parker, "The British Government and the C o m i n g of the War with Germany , 
1 9 3 9 , " in M . R . D . Foot , e d . . Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J .R. Western, London , 
1 9 7 6 , pp. 1 - 1 4 . 
8 2 C a b i n e t , 2 Sept. 1939 , 4:15 p . m . , 4 8 ( 3 9 ) , C A B 2 3 / 1 0 0 , a lso Aster, 1939. pp. 3 7 6 - 7 8 . 
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to Mussolini's conference proposal. They then made the statement approved 
by the cabinet that afternoon, i.e., that if the German government agreed to 
withdraw its troops, and if it expressed readiness to negotiate, then the British 
government would treat the situation "as if nothing had happened." Providing 
the status quo ante was restored, the British government would support either 
direct Polish-German negotiations, or a wider conference if the two parties so 
wished. 8 3 It is difficult to see this extraordinary statement, made on the second 
day of all-out German aggression against Poland, as anything but a last ditch 
effort to save the peace at the expense of the battered ally of France and Britain. 
While Halifax was received quietly in the House of Lords—where he en-
joyed great respect—the House of Commons exploded with rage against 
Chamberlain. What is more, some members of the Cabinet revolted. It was 
plain that if Chamberlain did not take a stand by 11 a.m. on September 3 — 
when the House of Commons was scheduled to meet—his government would 
fall. Therefore, Paris was informed that he could not wait another 48 hours 
for Hitler's answer. 8 4 The hope of a revolt by the German generals also fell 
through. Henderson reported that the German General Staff could not be per-
suaded to withdraw the troops from Poland, unless the Nazi regime fell first.85 
(In fact, they would not revolt against Hitler over the popular war against 
Poland, and expected him to lose support only if Germany faced a determined 
France and Britain.) Thus, the British ultimatum demanding an answer to the 
note of September 1, was delivered on September 3 at 9 a.m. with a deadline 
of 11 a.m. When no answer came, Britain found herself at war with Germany; 
France followed at 5 p.m., when its deadline also expired. 
* * * 
Halifax later wrote that neither the Polish nor Rumanian government was 
under any illusion that they might receive concrete help from Great Britain. 8 6 
Indeed, it is sometimes assumed that Britain and France fulfilled their obliga-
tions to Poland by merely entering into a state of war with Germany. However, 
aside from the fact that Hitler left them no option, we should bear in mind that 
both Powers had made military commitments to Poland. Thus, in the Anglo-
Polish General Staff Air talks, held in Warsaw in May 1939, the British com-
mitted themselves to bomb German military objectives if the Germans did so 
first in Poland. If the Germans bombed civilian objectives there, the British 
said they would first consult France. The agreed verbal protocol of these talks 
8 3 S e e Pari. Deb. H.C., 5th ser. v. 3 5 1 , c o l s . 2 8 0 - 8 5 ; s a m e , House of Lords, v . 114 , c o l s . 
9 5 2 - 5 4 . 
8 4 S e e Aster , 1939, pp. 3 8 2 - 8 8 ; for Chamberlain-Daladier te lephone conversat ion, 2 Sept . 9 :50 
p . m . , s ee D B F P , 3rd ser. v. VII , no . 7 4 0 . 
8 5 S e e Henderson to Hal i fax , D B F P , ibid., no . 7 2 5 . 
8 6 Halifax cited in Earl o f Birkenhead, Halifax. The Life of Lord Halifax, London , 1 9 6 5 , p . 
3 4 7 . 
Poland in British and French Policy in 1939 221 
was signed on June 1, 1939. 8 7 However, the Poles were not told that these 
commitments were abrogated by the British for fear of retaliatory German air 
attacks on France and Britain. 8 8 
Much greater commitments were made to Poland by France. According to 
the military protocols signed in Paris on May 19, if France was attacked by 
Germany, Poland was to come to France's aid by launching an attack from 
the East. If Germany attacked Poland, the French were to launch limited 
ground and air action at once, and to launch an offensive against Germany 
with the bulk of their forces on the fifteenth day after the German attack on 
Poland (i.e., on the completion of French mobilization). 8 9 We may well ask 
why this commitment was made at a time when the French and British General 
Staffs had already agreed to adopt a defensive strategy in the West? 9 0 Duroselle 
finds the commitment "difficult to explain;" Admathwaite puts it down to 
French "muddle;" while Robert Young claims that since the Poles knew French 
strategy to be defensive, they had only themselves to blame for taking France 
at her word. 9 1 Gamelin, for his part, gave contradictory explanations in his 
memoirs; first he claimed that the protocols did not specify an offensive with 
the bulk of French forces, while later he wrote that the Polish armies had 
collapsed, so there was no point in launching a French offensive.9? 
These arguments are specious to say the least. First of all, it is clear from 
the military protocols that French commitments were not the result of muddle. 
Secondly, the Polish General Staff knew what the French strategy was up to 
May 1939, i.e., to hold the Maginot Line and enter Belgium only if it were 
invaded by the Germans and then called for help. Bttt they were surely entitled 
to believe that in signing the protocols of May 19, the French General Staff 
had abandoned the old defensive strategy in favor of launching an all-out attack 
8 7 S e e Protocols of the Polish-British General Staffs Conference in Warsaw, May 1939, (in 
French) , Bellona, n o s . III-IV, L o n d o n , 1 9 5 7 , and offprint, 1958 . 
8 8 O n 12 August 1 9 3 9 , the French and British General Staffs dec ided the on ly w a y to help 
Poland w a s by an air o f fens ive in the West ; h o w e v e r , this w a s cance l led later, see Col . P. Le 
G o y e t , "Le théâtre d'opérations du Nord-Est ," Relations Franco-Britanniques, Paris, 1975* p, 
3 2 6 . 
8 9 For the Protocols o f Franco-Pol ish military conversat ions s igned in Paris 19 M a y 1 9 3 9 , see 
D D F , 2nd ser. v . X V I , no . 2 3 3 , and Bellona, L o n d o n , 1957 , II; offprint, 1 9 5 8 , pp . 1 2 - 1 3 . 
9 0 For d i scuss ions be tween the French and British General Staffs and agreements reached be-
tween 2 4 April and 17 M a y , see: papers by Le G o y e t and C o l . B . R . N e a v e - H i l l , in Relations 
Franco-Britanniques, 1 9 7 5 , pp. 1 3 6 - 7 7 , 3 3 8 - 4 9 ; also: P r a z m o w s k a , Britain, Poland, the East-
ern Front, 1939, c h . 4 ; documents in D D F , 2nd ser. v o l . X V , n o s . 2 5 4 , 2 7 4 ; vo l . X V I , n o s . 7 9 , 
193 . 
9 1 See Durose l l e , Décadence, p. 4 6 0 ; Adamthwai t e , France and the Coming of the Second 
World War, p. 3 1 9 ; Robert J. Y o u n g , In Command of France, French Foreign Policy and Military 
Planning, 1933-1940, Cambridge , M a s s . , L o n d o n , 1 9 7 9 , p. 2 3 3 . 
9 2 S e e Maurice G. G a m e l i n , Servir, Paris, 1 9 4 6 , v. II, pp. 4 1 8 - 1 9 , and v . I l l , Paris, 1947; 
c o m m e n t s by gen . W a c l a w Stach iewicz , Pisma, v . II, Zeszyty Historyczne, no . 5 0 , Paris, 1979 , 
pp. 2 6 7 , 2 8 8 . 
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on the Siegfried Line if the Germans attacked Poland. In any case, it was in 
France's best interest to mount such an attack when the bulk of German forces 
was tied down in Poland. In fact, we have the word of the Chief of the Polish 
General Staff, General Waclaw Stachiewicz, that the Poles expected the French 
to fulfill their commitments. We also know that the Polish War Minister, gen. 
Kasprzycki, did not sign the Paris protocols as an exercise in make-believe. 
On the contrary, the Polish defense Plan West—which could not be drawn up 
until the French said what they would do—was based on the principle that 
Polish forces must hold up the Germans all along the front, retreating when 
necessary, until the French attacked in the West. This would provide relief for 
the Poles, allowing them to regroup for a counter-attack. It is true the Polish 
Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz, feared that once Hitler 
had taken Danzig, the Corridor, and perhaps Upper Silesia as well, and then 
made a peace offer, French politicians might listen. That is why, aside from 
the military obligation made to the French to hold up the Germans, Smigly-
Rydz decided to fight for these areas instead of abandoning them and half of 
Poland as well, to hold the Vistula line. But he never doubted, nor did Foreign 
Minister Beck, that the French military would fulfill their commitments. 9 3 
While it is true that the military protocols of May 19 were not to assume 
the character of an official military agreement until the political accord inter-
preting the alliance was signed, and this was not done until September 4, the 
Poles can be excused for assuming that the French General Staff would prepare 
the necessary plans for an offensive against Germany in the West. Unfortu-
nately for the Poles, however, Gamelin made no plans to attack the Siegfried 
Line, which the Germans had not even completed. Had such an attack been 
prepared and launched, the French would have had a good chance of breaking 
through the thin German defenses and of occupying the Ruhr, the industrial 
heart of Germany. The French could also have accomplished this goal by 
disregarding Belgian objectives and marching through Belgium. However, the 
French General Staff had no such plans. 
It is not as difficult to understand why the French made their commitments 
to Poland as Duroselle thinks. In fact, the aim of the French General Staff was 
to have the Poles hold out as long as possible in order to gain time for France, 
hence the commitments. When the British asked gen. Gamelin at the first 
meeting of the Supreme Allied War Council at Abbeville on September 12, 
whether he would change his strategy if the Poles fought for two or three 
months, he replied that he would not do so. In his view, the role of the Poles 
was to win precious time for the Allies, so they could prepare for the moment 
when Germany would transfer the bulk of her forces to the West. 9 4 Thus, it is 
9 3 O n Pol i sh General Staff interpretation, see Ibid., pp. 2 7 3 - 7 4 ; see a lso Leszek M o c z u l s k i , 
Wojna Polska, Poznan, 1 9 7 2 , pp. 9 6 - 9 8 . 
^jSfie-François Bédarida, La Stratégie secrète de la drôle de quarre. Le Conseil Suprême 
Interallié, Septembre 1939-Avril 1940, Paris, ( C N R S ) , p . 1 9 7 9 , p. 9 5 and note J. ibid. 
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hard to avoid the impression that the French deliberately misled the Poles to 
believe they would launch an offensive against Germany—and then left them 
to fight alone. 
* * * 
In conclusion, it is is clear that the British guarantee to Poland, which was 
fully supported by France, was not designed to restore the balance of power 
in Europe and to provoke Hitler into a war in which Poland would have t a 
fight on Britain's side. On the contrary, the objective was to persuade Hitler 
to give up armed aggression and take what he wanted from Poland by way of 
so-called negotiations, in which the Poles would meekly concede his demands 
and thus save the peace. The Western Powers, for their part, would save face 
by guaranteeing the settlement, along with Germany, Italy, Poland herself— 
and after August 23, also the Soviet Union. 
It was surely a self-induced delusion to believe, as Chamberlain, Halifax, 
and their supporters apparently did at the time, and as some Western historians 
still do today, that the British guarantee would allow Poland to negotiate with 
Germany "on an equal footing and free from the fear of force." After all, this 
was hardly possible in view of the fact that Germany, which had a long frontier 
with Poland, was the greatest military power in Europe. Thus, A.J.P. Taylor 
was closest to the mark in viewing the guarantee as a continuation of appease-
ment because it envisaged further territorial revision in Eastern Europe. We 
should note here, however, that his justification of this policy on the grounds 
that it aimed to save peace, was the result of convictions acquired some twenty 
years later, when he was actively involved in the British "Ban the Bomb" 
movement. 9 5 Finally, the view that Britain was aiming to exclude the USSR 
through another Four Power agreement on the lines of the project of 1934, 9 6 
is correct only until late May, when Chamberlain decided to seek a treaty with 
the USSR. In any case, in 1939, there could be no real hope of establishing a 
lasting peace with Hitler. The best the British and French could hope for was 
to win more time, and this they were willing to do at the expense of their ally, 
Poland. 
In sum, the so-called new policy stemming from the British guarantee to 
Poland was a continuation of appeasement as followed toward Czechoslovakia 
in 1938, but dressed up in new clothes. Let us look at five points of compari-
son: 
(1). In 1938, Czechoslovakia was an ally of France, but not Britain; France, 
however, followed the British lead. Britain strove at first for a negotiated or 
9 5 For A . J . P . Tay lor ' s re-evaluation o f Munich in light o f his involvement in the British m o v e -
ment for nuclear disarmament in the late 1 9 5 0 ' s , see his memoirs: A Personal History, N e w 
York , 1 9 8 3 , pp. 2 2 5 - 3 0 , 2 3 4 . 
9 6 O n the Four P o w e r Pact, see note 3 above . 
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mediated settlement between the Czechoslovak government and the Sudeten 
Germans. When this proved impossible, Chamberlain accepted Hitler's offer 
of a conference—an offer he had suggested himself, but which was made to 
Hitler by Mussolini. At Munich, Hitler obtained the Sudetenland; this meant 
that Czechoslovakia was left without her mountain fortifications and her key 
industrial regions; thus, she was completely dependent on Germany, even if 
Hitler had not marched in on March 14-15. 
The British goal in giving a guarantee to Poland on March 31, 1939, con-
cluding the Anglo-Polish agreement of April 6, and the alliance of August 25, 
was to bring about a "negotiated" settlement between Germany and Poland on 
terms which the latter had rejected, i.e., the return of Danzig and the cession 
of a belt of territory in the Polish Corridor for German extra-territorial commu-
nication with Danzig and East Prussia. This would have made Poland totally 
dependent on Germany. The French raised no objections. 
(2). In 1938, France publicly asserted she would fulfill her obligations to 
Czechoslovakia—though Bonnet privately told the Czechs France would never 
fight over the Sudetenland—and Britain hinted that if war broke out, it might 
not be confined to the belligerents, thus implying it might become a European 
war. Indeed, on September 27, the British government stated that if Czechoslo-
vakia was attacked and France went to her aid, then Britain and the USSR 
would stand by France. (In fact, the Soviet government had not been con-
sulted.) The British navy was placed on alert and the French army was mobi-
lized. 
However, the French made no offensive plans to fulfill their obligations to 
Czechoslovakia, which they could only have done by attacking Germany in 
the West. Likewise, though the French and British made military commitments 
to Poland in 1939, the French made no plans for an offensive in the West as 
per the military protocols of May 19, while the British did not inform the Poles 
they had abandoned their commitment to bomb West Germany if the Germans 
bombed Poland. 
(3). While there were no negotiations in 1938, for expanding the Franco-
Soviet alliance into a triple alliance with Britain, the 1939 policy of drawing 
the USSR into an alliance against Germany was foreshadowed in the British 
statement of September 27, cited above. 
(4). In 1938, Chamberlain forced President Benes to accept a British media-
tor, Lord Runciman; however, as noted above, this effort failed. In 1939, the 
Western Powers projected or proposed mediation between Poland and Ger-
many by the Scandinavian states (not pursued), by the Vatican (Papal Nuncio's 
Pr°i>QSal to the Polish Government), by the Italian government (not pursued), 
and by the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig (British proposal 
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to Poland). The aim of mediation, as of negotiations, was to give Hitler what 
he wanted while avoiding war. 
(5). At the Munich Conference, Britain and France offered a guarantee to 
what was left of Czechoslovakia, conditional on the settlement of outstanding 
Polish and Hungarian claims and on the adhesion of Germany and Italy. When 
Hitler annexed the Czech lands and set up a puppet Slovakia, Chamberlain 
announced in the House of Commons that the guarantee offered in 1938 was 
no longer valid—because Czechoslovakia had collapsed. 
According to the Franco-British plan of 1939, a Polish-German settlement, 
whether reached in bilateral negotiations or at an international conference, was 
to be secured by an international guarantee signed by the Western Powers, 
Germany, Italy, and Poland (after the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, Hitler 
proposed that the USSR also be a guarantor). 
Thus, just as in 1938, so in 1939, peace was to be saved, or at least war 
staved off for a time, at the expense of the victim, who was to "agree" volun-
tarily to German demands. The difference was one of form. Neither the British 
nor the French government could openly bully Poland into submission, nor 
could they agree to a carbon copy of the Munich Conference; their public 
opinion would not stand for either. Therefore, Poland was either to "negotiate" 
with Germany, or be invited to an international conference. In either case, 
however, she was to accept Hitler's demands. 
But Poland refused to consider the German terms she had rejected as a basis 
for negotiation, while Hitler refused to wait. He haqUhe pact with Stalin in his 
pocket and believed that this would prevent France and Britain from going to 
war if he attacked Poland. He also believed that if he did not attack by Septem-
ber 1, the autumn rains would turn Poland into a bog and war might have to 
be put off; this he was determined to avoid. 
* * * 
Given French and British perceptions of their own weakness, their over-
whelming desire to avoid war, and their view that limited German expansion 
at Poland's expense would at least win them time, it may well be that no other 
policy could have been expected on their part. But by the same token, it i. 
high time to dispose of the myths that the British guarantee to Poland was the 
end of appeasement; that with the guarantee, the Poles could have negotiated 
freely with Germany without the fear of force, but refused to do so because 
they were bereft of the sense of reality; that France and Britain carried out 
their obligations to Poland merely by entering a state of war with Germany; 
and finally, that the Poles had only themselves to blame for trusting the word 
of their allies, notably the French commitment to launch an all-out offensive 
against Germany if the latter attacked Poland. 
In 1938, appeasement worked because Hitler accepted it. In 1939, when he 
secured an agreement with the Soviet Union, it led to war. Here we should 
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note that the idea of a nonaggression pact with Hitler was by no means new 
to Stalin in 1939. In fact, he had suggested it to the Germans in May 1935, 
and then at the turn of 1936-37. 9 7 This was well before the Munich Confer-
ence, which some historians see as the reason for his shift to Germany, and 
had nothing to do with the much later Polish refusal (August 1939) to agree 
to the passage of Soviet troops through Poland. However, we shall have to 
await the opening of the Soviet diplomatic archives to obtain a more complete 
picture of Stalin's policy. Let us hope that the new Soviet "Glasnost" will last 
a long time and stretch that far. 
9 7 See : Li tv inov proposal o f a N o n a g g r e s s i o n Pact to German ambassador von der Schulenburg 
o f 8 M a y 1935 , D G F P , ser. C . v . IV , no . 7 8 , p. 138. In making this proposal , Li tv inov referred 
to the German proposal m a d e after the Anglo-French-Ital ian Stresa Declaration on Austrian inde-
p e n d e n c e , in w h i c h the German government stated it was ready to conc lude nonaggress ion pacts 
"with neighboring p o w e r s , " s e e , ibid., no . 2 9 , p. 5 1 ; at that t ime , o f course , Germany and the 
U S S R j v e j e separated from each other by Poland, just as they were in August 1939 . For Sov ie t 
proposals in 1 9 3 6 - 3 7 , see D G F P , ser. C , v . V I , nos . 183 , 195 . 
